Eckerstrom, Peter J.

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Question Response Comments/Notes
1. Which of the following Justices from the U.S. Supreme Court most reflects your judicial philosophy?
2. Please rate your judicial philosophy on a scale of 1 to 10, with "strict constructionism"1 being a "1" and "noninterpretivism" being a "10."
3. Please state if you AGREE or DISAGREE with the following statement from Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts: "Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire."
4. Please rate your agreement with the reasoning in this statement from the U.S. Supreme Court on a scale of 1 to 10 with a "1" for strongly agree to a "10" for strongly disagree: "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
5. Please rate your agreement with this statement from former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall on a scale of 1 to 10 with a "1" for strongly agree to a "10" for strongly disagree: "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law."

Judicial Decisions

PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA, INC. v. MARK BRNOVICH
Case Number: 2 CA-CV 2022-0116Question Presented: Whether § 13-3603 can be reconciled with more recent statutes in Title 36, such that a licensed physician who performs an elective abortion in conformity with Title 36 is not subject to prosecution under § 13-3603? Decision: The statutes can be reconciled. Read together, the laws permit physicians to perform abortions as up to 15 weeks regardless of § 13-3603. These physicians are not subject to prosecution under § 13-3603.Judge Position: Joined in the 3/0 decision and wrote in concurrence.Summary of Dissent or Concurrence: Concurrence by J. Eckerstrom: “I join fully with the majority’s reasoning because it best complies with our legislature’s express instructions that we give all existing abortion regulations vitality: that we impliedly repeal no provision, old or new. It also executes our legislature’s expectation that, to the extent its express instructions do not settle all disputes in construction, we will conduct the obligatory harmonization process in conformity with our settled canons for doing so. By this process, we show our strictest fidelity to legislative intent.”
STATE OF ARIZONA v. HON. BUTLER/VALENZUELA
Case Number: 2 CA-SA 2021-0043Question Presented: Whether the Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR) provision in the Arizona Constitution allowing a victim to refuse an interview by the defendant applies to a victim-witness called to testify in a case involving a different victim and the prosecution of the same defendant whose crime against the victim-witness took place in another state.Decision: The VBR provision applies to a non-Arizona victim.Judge Position: Joined in the 3/0 decision.
TIMOTHY MATTHEWS v. ICA, CITY OF TUCSON, TRISTAR
Case Number: 2 CA-IC 2020-0001Question Presented: Whether the workers’ compensation mental injury statue, A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B), violates article XVIII, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution by requiring an “unexpected, unusual or extraordinary” stress related to the worker’s occupation in order to establish a compensable claim?Decision: The law does not conflict with the Arizona Constitution. Judge Position: Dissented from the 2/1 decision.Summary of Dissent or Concurrence: Dissent by J. Eckerstrom: “The provision we address, § 23-1043.01(B), not only conflicts with article XVIII, § 8 in application; it does so squarely in its language….I would therefore follow the reasoning and precedent our supreme court set forth in Grammatico and hold § 23-1043.01(B) unconstitutional on the same grounds.”
STATE OF ARIZONA v. SHANNON PAUL ZUCK 
Case Number: 2 CA-CR 2019-0130Question Presented: Whether the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motions to suppress evidence gained through disclosure of identifying information by an internet service provider and an ensuing search warrant, and a jury instruction permitting the jury to infer the minority of the exploited children violated the United States and Arizona constitutions.Decision: There was no error and the court affirms the convictions and sentences.Judge Position: Joined in the 3/0 decision.
STATE OF ARIZONA v. JOHNNY ANGEL GOMEZ
Case Number: 2 CA-CR 2020-0127Question Presented: Whether the defendant’s two convictions and concurrent sentences for aggravated assault as to each of the five victims who suffered fractured bones, facial lacerations, and other significant injuries violates his constitutional protections against double jeopardy..Decision: Aggravated assault using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial disfigurement are distinct and separate offenses so the defendant’s dual convictions and concurrent sentences for the aggravated assault of each of his five significantly injured victims under subsections (A)(2) and (A)(3) of the aggravated assault statute do not violate double jeopardy principles. Judge Position: Authored the 3/0 decision.
STATE OF ARIZONA v. BENJAMIN HENRY TYAU
Case Number: 2 CA-CR 2020-0171Question Presented: Whether A.R.S. § 13-905(K), which precludes persons convicted of certain crimes from applying to have their judgments of guilt set aside, violates Tyau’s constitutional rights to petition the government for redress of grievances, due process, and equal protection under the United States and Arizona constitutions.Decision: The statute is constitutional.Judge Position: Authored the 3/0 decision.
STATE OF ARIZONA v. JAVIER RIVERA CABRERA
Case Number: 2 CA-CR 2019-0128Question Presented: Whether the trial court violated Cabrera’s constitutional rights by denying him his constitutional right to present a complete defense.Decision: Cabrera failed to show he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.Judge Position: Joined in the 3/0 decision.
STATE OF ARIZONA v. WILLIAM MIXTON
Case Number: 2 CA-CR 2017-0217Question Presented: 1. Whether the state violated Mixton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution by obtaining, without a warrant, his internet protocol address and subscriber information from entities providing internet communication services. 2. If a constitutional violation occurred, whether the court must suppress evidence gained as a result of learning Mixton’s identity, or did the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply, permitting admission of that evidence at Mixton’s trial.Decision: Although the evidence used to convict Mixton was obtained in violation of his right to be free from government interference in his private affairs under article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.Judge Position: Concurred in part and dissented in parth in the 3/0 decision.Summary of Dissent or Concurrence: Concurring in part and dissenting in part by J. Eckerstrom: The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution provides the same protections as Arizona's private affairs clause, not less. Concurring in part and dissenting in part by J. Espinosa: “I respectfully disagree with the majority’s novel discovery of constitutional protection for internet subscriber information under the Arizona Constitution, particularly in this day and age of constant personal internet connection and dependency, where little, absent extraordinary measures, can confidently be deemed private and shielded.”